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Constitutions are generally made by people with
no previous experience in constitution making.
The assistance they receive from outsiders is often
less useful than it may appear. The most pertinent
foreign experience may reside in distant countries,
whose lessons are unknown or inaccessible.
Moreover, although constitutions are intended to
endure, they are often products of the particular
crisis thatforced their creation. Drafters are usually
heavily affected by a desire to avoid repeating
unpleasant historical experiences or to emulate what
seem to be successful constitutional models. Theirs
is a heavily constrained environment, made even
more so by distrust and dissensus if the constitution
follows a protracted period of internal conflict.
Given all these conditions, drafting a constitution
that is aptfor the problems faced by the drafters is
difficult, and prospects are not enhanced by advice
that drafters follow a uniform constitutionalprocess
that emphasizes openness and public participation
above all other values.
Les constitutions sont ginlralement ridigies par
des personnes sans expirience prialable dans la
preparation de constitutions. L'aide rerue de
l'extirieur est souvent moins utile que lon croit.
L'exptrienceetrangire lapluspertinentepeutprovenir
de pays lointains o4 les lerons ne sont ni connues ni
accessibles. De plus, bien que le but des constitutions
soit de durer, elles sont souvent le rsultat d'une crise
pricise qui en a forcd la criation. Les ridacteurs
cherchent alors h Iviter de ripter des experiences
historiques disagriables ou h imiter des modeles
constitutionnels ayant rdussi. Leur environnement
est alors tr~s restreint et la situation est aggravie par
la me'flance et la dissension si la constitution fait suite
h une piriode prolongle de conflit interne. Compte
tenu de ces conditions, il est difficile de ridiger une
constitution convenant aux problmes auxquels
les ridacteurs font face et les perspectives ne sont
pas meilleures si les ridacteurs suivent un processus
constitutionnel uniforme soulignant l'ouverture et la
participation du public sur routes les autres valeurs.
I. THE KNOWLEDGE PROBLEM
There is a great deal of experience in the world in the making of new
constitutions, but also a formidable problem of lost knowledge. Most people
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who make constitutions have never performed the task before and will not
perform it again. Most of the time, their experience will not be recorded or
utilized, and their successors will go on to make the same mistakes and some
new ones as well.
The task is a bit like choosing a university president. In the United
States, search committees consisting of faculty members, university
trustees, administrators, alumni, and sometimes students are appointed to
search for a new president. This is an inherently difficult task, because it
is hard to specify the precise qualities needed in the office and even harder
to predict whether a candidate who has not been a university president
before will possess those qualities when the time comes for exercising them.
Furthermore, a new president is chosen only every five or ten years, and in
some cases even less frequently, so that, having performed the task once,
the members of the search committee will never choose another president.
Hence the committee's experience and the knowledge it has gained are
lost.
Contrast with this the job of a personnel office in choosing an employee
whose tasks are purely routine - a mail sorter or a janitor. The personnel
office knows with considerable specificity what a janitor's job is and what
qualifications a good janitor needs. When the appropriate applicant walks
through the door, it does not take much time to decide that the candidate
has the requisite credentials. The personnel office has hired many such
people before. Unlike the presidential search committee, the personnel
office has no problem of lost knowledge. It has a memory.
Constitutional choice is like presidential choice in a university. The
exigencies of the task are somewhat indeterminate, subject to a variety of
interpretations, and at the same time context-specific. Those who perform
the task will not have made it their profession, and no two people engaged
in it at the same time and place will necessarily have a clear idea or the same
idea of what institutions need to be chosen.
Of course, in recent decades, constitution-making has become an
international and comparative exercise in ways it was not previously. There
is an emerging literature that is accessible, there are foreign advisers and
foreign advice (sometimes unwanted foreign advice'), there are conferences
1 It is worth recalling a story told to me by the chair of an African constitutional commission. As
soon as he was appointed, he was approached by an American consulting firm that offered to run
the entire constitutional process for him, assuring him that there would be no cost involved, as a
grant could be obtained to cover all costs incurred. The offer was declined.
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on constitution-making, and there are many ways to learn something from
the experience of other states that have been through a constitutional process.
There are strong trends in institutional adoption, such as constitutional
courts2 and certain electoral systems,3 and there are also advocates of certain
modalities of constitution-making (some of which I shall discuss shortly).
While Ruritanians making a constitution for Ruritania may be starting from
scratch, there are purveyors of foreign experience ready to help, just as there are
search firms ready to help a university committee find the right president.
Yet the impact of these changed conditions is not entirely benign. In
some cases, international involvement is window dressing to demonstrate the
open, democratic character of the process of constitutional choice, but the real
decisions are the same as would have been made without that involvement.
In other cases, the expanded literature and the ubiquitous foreign experts add
only noise to the process, as unpromising leads are chased down. On one
side, some foreign experts have a standard repertoire of recommendations that
they bring with them. Often these recommendations are biased toward the
institutions of their home country, as in the case of the Norwegian electoral
consultant in a Balkan country who kept coming back to the superiority of a
proposed system that turned out to be the Norwegian electoral system. Very
often such experts simply want to sell their pet provisions - for parliamentary
regimes, or runoff elections, or (in the case of Americans) a due process clause,
or whatever.4 I refer to such people as "provision merchants." On the other
side, even when foreign experts bring good, useful comparative knowledge -
and it does not need to be foreign experts who bring that kind of knowledge
- constitutional planners and drafters may ignore it, or fail to recognize its
significance, or misconstrue it, or misuse it.
Why does this happen? It is not merely that we are all prisoners of our
own culture and parochial experience. It is, rather, that to decide which
comparative models might be pertinent requires a considerable degree of
abstraction. If a constitution-maker in, let us say, Romania is advised that
the most relevant constitutional design to deal with a particular problem is to
2 See Tom Ginsburg, "The Global Spread of Constitutional Review" in Keith E. Whittington,
R. Daniel Kelemen & Gregory A. Caldeira, eds., Oxford Handbook of Law and Politics (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, forthcoming). See also Donald L. Horowitz, "Constitutional Courts: A
Concise Introduction" (2006) 17:4 J. of Democracy 125.
3 Andrew Reynolds, Ben Reilly & Andrew Ellis, Electoral System Design: The New International
IDEA Handbook (Stockholm: International IDEA, 2005).
4 1 have met American judges who, in the 1990s, had to consult an atlas to locate the East European
country that they had agreed to help in its constitutional deliberations. What they had was an
understanding of their own country's constitution.
Review of Constitutional Studies/Revue d'dtudes constitutionnelles
Constitution-Making: A Process Filled With Constraint
be found in Senegal, it will require a very sophisticated diagnosis of Romania's
problem at a somewhat abstract level and an equally sophisticated assessment
of Senegal's problem and the impact of the Senegalese design on that problem
to convince the Romanian planner even to take a closer look, much less to be
persuaded. Most people prefer to analyze what they already know or respect,
and they have defenses against what is foreign and unfamiliar. Not surprisingly,
the borrowing that takes place in a constitutional design process is typically
biased toward institutions drawn from countries with which the borrower
has cultural affinity (in ex-colonies, usually the institutions of the former
metropole), countries that are the most conspicuously successful democracies,
or, in divided societies, countries that are the most conspicuously successful
democracies in divided societies, such as Switzerland.5
There is another species of outsider who turns up in constitutional
deliberations, or sometimes before they are begun, and not always with felicitous
results. This is the expert on negotiation, rather than on constitutional design.
The negotiation expert typically possesses (and professes) no knowledge of
constitutions or of the intergroup conflict constitutions need to ameliorate.
Rather, the negotiation expert is a "facilitator," a process person who urges
the parties, above all, to "get to yes," to reach agreement. The thrust of the
efforts of negotiation experts is to push toward narrowing differences during
discussions and to emphasize areas of agreement, so as to facilitate conclusion
of the deal.
As we shall see shortly, it is sometimes better not to reach agreement.
This is particularly so if the agreement threatens to worsen relations among
the contenders or if the process of reaching agreement independently sours
relations among stronger and weaker parties. But there is another issue hidden
beneath the rhetoric of those who think bargaining to produce agreement is
always the way to proceed. Bargaining involves exchange, but the quid pro
quo is not always best for divided societies. They need coherent institutions to
reduce their conflict. Compromise and coherence are often at odds. Something
approximating a planning process might be preferable for constitution-making,
so that attention can be paid to the fit of the parts in the final product.
I have spoken so far of a single constitution-maker or constitutional
planner, but convincing one planner is not enough. Constitution-making is a
collective enterprise, with all the perils that we know attend collective decisions
5 For a fuller discussion of model bias, see Donald L. Horowitz, "Constitutional Design: Proposals
versus Processes" in Andrew Reynolds, ed., The Architecture ofDemocrdcy (Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2002) 15 at 31-32.
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in which the preferences of the important actors diverge. In a society making
the transition from authoritarianism, the actors who must choose among
competing democratic designs are likely to be people with little experience
living under any of the contending democratic designs. Theirs is an abstract
collective choice. If, on the other hand, they have had an experience of living
under a certain set of constitutional arrangements, then they are likely to be
attached to those institutions - electoral systems, for example - that seem to
have worked successfully. For all of these reasons and more, the constitution
that is perfectly apt for the situation of the state that adopts it is at best
elusive.
II. CRITERIA OF SUCCESS AND FAILURE
I do, however, want to enter one caveat here. It is important not to
exaggerate the extent to which constitutions are inapt. Often it is claimed that
the constitution of a certain country "failed" or that a certain institutional
innovation, say a particular electoral system, "did not work," because the
regime was overthrown by a military coup or succumbed to a civil war.
Exactly this sort of judgment was pronounced for Lebanon, whose institutions
to accommodate sectarian conflict were adopted in the so-called National
Pact of 1943.6 When Lebanon lapsed into civil war in 1976, it was said that
the institutions of the National Pact, which included its ethnically reserved
offices, its ethnic quotas in government service, and its electoral system,
had "failed"- and failed in an undifferentiated way. In fact, however, all
these institutions did not fail. The quota system failed, because the 6:5 ratio
of Christians to Muslims was fixed and permanent, based as it was on the
sectarian proportions of the census of 1932, and unable to be revised in the
light of demographic changes favoring Muslims. 7 Lebanese institutions also
collapsed under the weight of external forces, especially the influx of armed
Palestinians in 1970, which, as other groups saw it, required each community
to have its own militia. Among the institutions that did not fail was the
electoral system, which was conducive to intergroup accommodation and was
reconstituted along essentially the same lines after the conclusion of the civil
war and again after the withdrawal of Syrian forces in 2005. The electoral
system utilized a combination of reserved seats, multimember constituencies,
and common-roll elections, which fostered mixed tickets, encouraged
intragroup competition, and softened intergroup conflict.
6 Leonard Binder, ed., Politics in Lebanon (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1966).
7 For the hazards of fixed quotas, see Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley & Los
Angeles: University of California Press, 2000) at 586-87.
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So the argument that, because a constitutional order collapses, every
component of that order must be deemed to have failed is suffused with fallacy.
Military coups may be exogenous events that can bring down regimes; they
may have occurred no matter what constitution was in force. Alternatively,
an institutional arrangement might have softened a certain conflict had it
been adopted soon enough. If the conflict overwhelms the constitutional
order under these conditions, that is no evidence that the arrangement was
inadequate. We know enough about political planning to understand that it
nearly always comes after the fact and so is not really planning at all.
If I am correct that constitutional orders fail for all sorts of reasons unre-
lated to their appropriateness, then it is incumbent on us to be more careful
to avoid facile and mistaken causal attribution. It is preferable to ask about
an institutional device whether the mechanism it was supposed to activate
was in fact activated, not whether the overall design "succeeded" or "failed."
Success or failure of an institution cannot be measured by the survival of the
regime of whose constitution the institutional device was a part, but only a
part.
Despite the obstacles, it is possible to enhance the chance that a
reasonably apt constitution will be adopted. Many constitutions drafted in
the period after 1989 have had to deal with the problems of severely divided
societies, such as Northern Ireland, Bosnia, Cyprus, Fiji, or Sri Lanka.
There is a debate in the scholarly literature on this subject between, on the
one hand, those who think it best to entrench consociational guarantees of
group vetoes, proportional representation of groups in the legislature and
cabinet, cultural autonomy, and proportional financial allocations to groups
and, on the other, those who think these guarantees provide no reason for
politicians to moderate the conflicts the consociational approach is intended
to ameliorate. And so these others (myself included) wish to concentrate
instead on providing politicians with incentives - including, prominently,
electoral incentives - to behave moderately.8
I leave aside the contested matter of the effectiveness of the two
approaches, because here I wish to discuss the matter of process. Process can
affect outcomes, benign or otherwise. My theme is that process cannot be
discussed in the abstract, from apriori premises. The process of constitution-
making should depend on the class of problems faced by the constitution-
makers.
8 See, e.g., Horowitz, supra note 5 at 19-25. Compare Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1977).
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III. THE CONSTITUTION-MAKING
ENVIRONMENT
It is best to begin at the beginning, with the constitution itself. All
constitutions worthy of the name have two sets of features, which we may
refer to crudely as the "mechanical" and the "ideological-aspirational." By
mechanical, I mean that constitutions need to set out, at least in general terms,
how government will work, where particular competences reside, how power
will be divided or shared, what exercises of power are prohibited or limited,
and how abuses of power will be redressed. By ideological-aspirational, I mean
that proper constitutions embody some statement about the sort of common
life the body politic aims to establish. Sometimes this statement is explicit,
and sometimes it must be derived from the provisions of the document, but
it is usually there. Hence the semi-sacred character of some constitutions.
People tend to get invested in constitutions by virtue of their connection to
collective aspirations.
The fact that such a statement is embedded in the constitution provides
an important caution in constitution-making: In societies in which sharply
divergent aspirations are present and a common life cannot be assumed,
constitution-making is a difficult task at best. It cannot be supposed that
clever drafting can solve the problem by merely writing around it. It may
be preferable not to make a constitution in these conditions, or to make it in
steps, if consensus on fundamentals of this kind cannot be found. More on
this as we proceed.
The mechanical and ideological-aspirational features of a constitution
are related, in that a statement of common purposes facilitates acceptance
of difficult decisions concerning apportionment of power and redress for
its abuse. For example, the United States Constitution, in various ways,
indicates that it aims to establish a republic of equal citizens living under a
government of limited or checked powers, in which territorial affiliation has
some fairly strong significance - through federalism, a Senate of equal state
representation, and the Electoral College. Since interstate mobility has greatly
undermined state-level allegiances, some parts of this aspirational statement
are now looking slightly shopworn.
Constitutions are supposed to be forward-looking instruments; they
are plans. For this reason, Jon Elster counsels that they should not be
Review of Constitutional Studies/Revue d'tudes constitutionnelles
Constitution-Making: A Process Filled With Constraint
made by those who could benefit from their operation.9 Legislators, he
says, should not be entrusted with the task. Rather, specially convened,
transitory bodies should be assigned the job. This advice, however, is
often difficult to follow, because of the fraught nature of the occasions for
constitution-making.
A constitution is intended to serve for the ages, to be able to respond to
conditions other than those that called it into existence. But let us confront
some uncomfortable facts about constitution-making that bear on the sense
of a constitution as a forward-looking, durable design for living together.
Constitutions are almost always made in times of crisis. The literature on
legislative agenda-setting makes it rather clear that the issue ofa new constitution
cannot even be put on the table without a crisis.1° The constitutions produced
in Afghanistan in 2004 and Iraq in 2005 after wars that overthrew sitting
regimes may be extreme in this respect, but they are not wholly atypical. But
crisis may be a condition that arises without a cataclysmic event such as a war.
By crisis, I mean a time when the existing arrangements have been shown
to be illegitimate, as in Eastern Europe after 1989, or ineffective, as in the
United States after 1786, or both, as in Indonesia after 1998.
It needs to be borne in mind that a problem arises if a constitution
that is ineffective nevertheless possesses legitimacy for significant segments
of a heterogeneous population, as Indonesia's did for secular nationalists.
The nationalists saw the ineffective and undemocratic 1945 constitution
as the very embodiment of their history, not because it was ineffective and
undemocratic but because it was the product of a time when they were
ascendant. The constitution, drafted by an academic named Supomo, was
associated with Indonesia's first president, Sukarno, who revived it in 1959,
after it had been superseded for some years by a parliamentary constitution.
By 1999, the secular nationalist camp was no longer ascendant, but it was
still the largest camp in a divided society, having won a third of the votes
in the parliamentary elections of that year. The camp was led by Sukarno's
daughter, Megawati Sukarnoputri, who was most reluctant to tamper with
her father's handwork. In such cases - and there are more of these than
might be thought - constitutional design is synonymous with walking on
eggs. With great skill and discretion, it can be done, but only with great skill
and discretion.
9 Jon Elster, "Forces and Mechanisms in the Constitution-Making Process" (1995) 45 Duke Law J.
364.
10 John Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, 2d ed. (New York: Harper Collins,
1995).
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Constitutions are forward-looking documents, but they are made by
people who are deeply affected by their view of their own history, sometimes
blindingly so. More often than not, that history consists of experience the
drafters would prefer to avoid. And, insofar as they associate particular
governing institutions with unpleasant history, that history - or, rather,
their sense of that history - constrains their institutional choices. It is no
accident that constitution-drafters in Iraq, a most centralized state until the
fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003, opted to create one of the most decentralized
federations in the world. The history to which constitutional drafters advert
also includes the history of the events that have brought about the transitional
moment in which they are doing their work, and so the document they produce
is very likely to be tailored to redress the deficiencies that have been most
recently apparent. In almost every way, constitutions are forward-looking
instruments crafted by people who are looking backward.
Success in constitution-mnaking, therefore, inevitably involves not just
creating a good plan but being able to achieve the goals of the moment and
to deal well with history - and by deal well with, I mean not permit history
to bias and limit the available choices so as to produce inapt results - for
history is the unseen framer at the table. The American framers very nearly
fell into this trap in 1787, when, having had unpleasant experience with the
Crown, they were inclined to create a constitution with a very weak collective
executive and were only saved from this course by the actions of two delegates
to the constitutional convention, Gouverneur Morris and James Wilson, who
were knowledgeable about a more recent and satisfactory experience with a
single executive, the governor of New York.11 It was the ability of the framers
to provide a more differentiated view of the possible choices that avoided a
choice that might have replicated some of the deficiencies of the Articles of
Confederation.
Constitution-making is a matter of choosing from an array of institutions
in an environment that usually narrows and closes the plausible options, if
it does not actually prevent many serious possibilities from being considered
at all. It is a story of decision-making under severe conditions of constraint,
and this constraint is not just due to idiosyncracies of history and historical
recollection. As I have said, a constitution is a timeless document made in a
timebound way - for a long time horizon by people with short time horizons,
for the future by people bound to the past. But it is also a document that
reflects choices from a smaller menu of choices than ought to be available to
11 Charles C. Thach, Jr., The Creation ofthe Presidency, 1775-1789, 2d ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1969).
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the framers, who are typically knowledgeable about (at best) a few countries
and a few possibilities.
Sometimes choices are not merely made from a limited menu but are
not even on the menu, because they are foreordained. In Northern Ireland
at the time of the Good Friday Agreement in 1998, the choice of electoral
system was not disputed, because it was not seen as a choice. Northern
Ireland had used the single transferable vote (STV) during an earlier period
of devolved democracy, and the Irish Republic also used that system. The
choice of electoral system was barely on the table. 2 Yet, years later, after
several elections had shown that STV did not encourage voters to cast
ballots for candidates of groups other than their own, despite abundant
opportunity to do so in six-member constituencies, the question began to
be asked "whether an electoral system which maximises communal choice
and ensures so little dependence on the other community for success fits the
current needs in Northern Ireland."'13 Perhaps the electoral system should
have been on the table at the outset.
I have not yet referred to time constraints, but these are often severe.
There may be a deadline for a constitutional commission to issue its report or
for elections to be held. In general, deadlines constrict options, and especially
limit consideration of unfamiliar options, thus channeling decisions
toward proposals with historical or cultural resonance or with support
among external advisors who can certify the international respectability of
particular choices currently in vogue. In short, the prevalence of deadlines
and the crisis atmosphere in which constitutions are made both inhibit
deliberation.
So does the fact that the staff is usually assembled for the task in a rushed
fashion and ad hoc. Lines of authority are not always clear, and the ability
of outside experts to connect with staff is subject to vagaries of personality
and prior experience. The infrastructure that supports the constitution-
makers often suffers from the same disabilities as the constitution-makers
themselves do.
12 For the making of the Good FridayAgreement, see Donald L. Horowitz, "Explaining the Northern
Ireland Agreement: The Sources of an Unlikely Constitutional Consensus" (2002) 32 British J. of
Political Science 193. For STV, see ibid. at 212-13.
13 Sydney Elliott, "North vote sees over 80 percent of transfers stay within main parties" Irish Times
(1 December 2003) 16.
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IV. DIVERGENT VISIONS
Up to this point, what I have been saying is that constitution-making, like
many other processes of public choice, is suffused with constraint, and that
it is also vexed by some additional constraints that inhere in constitutional
decision more than in some other processes. There may be - but need not be
- a need to make constitutional decisions in times not merely of crisis but of
turmoil. Relations among the actors may be permeated by distrust, particularly
if the document is to be negotiated between an outgoing authoritarian or
semi-democratic regime and pro-democracy insurgents, and even more if the
two sides are ethnically differentiated. The process is by no means habitual;
ground rules are unspecified; participants are inexperienced in the task at
hand; and external expertise may be unreliable, biased, or difficult to screen.
I have yet to discuss divergent constitutional visions.
A new constitution is often necessary because an authoritarian regime
has been weakened or overthrown or because a protracted armed conflict has
reached a stalemate or been terminated by a peace agreement. The fact of a
decisive turn from formerly ascendant political forces does not necessarily
mean there is a new consensus. On the contrary, a new balance of power may
simply mean that open political dissensus has come to supplant a previous
forced consensus or a military conflict. This dissensus is very likely to extend
to constitutional fundamentals.
The constitution of Iraq is a perfect, if extreme, illustration.14 The regime
of Saddam Hussein was supported almost exclusively by the Sunni minority.
The Shia majority and the large Kurdish minority, both oppressed by Saddam,
were understandably wary of central power and sought a constitution that
would provide for a very weak central government. They produced,. in the
end, one of the loosest federations in the world. The central government
has relatively few powers. All powers not explicitly conferred on the central
government are to be held by provinces and, if provinces choose to amalgamate
into regions, by regions. Regional powers are entrenched. No amendment
may be enacted to reduce the powers of regions without their consent. The
constitution is congenial to Kurds who wish to create a single Kurdish region
in the north and to those Shia who wish to create a large Shia region in the
south. It is deeply at odds with the preferences of Sunni, who are firmly
attached to a single Iraq with a strong central government and an indissoluble
attachment to the Arab world.
14 Permanent Constitution of the Republic of Iraq, 2005.
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The process by which this constitution was produced deepened the chasm
between Sunni and Kurdish-Shia views of the appropriate dispensation for Iraq.
15
Drafted under a deadline, as many constitutions are, the Iraq constitution
was also created under conditions that biased the deliberations against Sunni
voices. In January 2005, there had been an election to the Transitional
National Assembly (TNA), which appointed the Constitutional Committee.
Unfortunately, the TNA had been elected under national list-system
proportional representation. For this reason, when Sunni voters boycotted
those elections, there were no territorial constituencies that in Sunni areas
would inevitably have elected Sunni legislators even in the face of very low
turnout resulting from the boycott. Sunni were therefore dramatically
underrepresented in the TNA. The formation of a government consumed
three months, and the creation of the drafting committee used another month,
leaving only three months to produce the finished document. Because Sunni
were not prominent in the TNA, the committee was disproportionately
composed of Shia and Kurds.
Six months after the election, fifteen Sunni Arabs were added to
the committee, but for the most part they did not affect the outcome,
because Shia and Kurds met informally outside the committee to produce
a constitution that reflected Kurdish and Shia preferences that were, as
I have suggested, thoroughly at odds with Sunni constitutional ideals.
Sunni protested the process and the product, but to no avail. The draft
was approved in a referendum. Assurances were given that amendments
would follow, in order to make the document more acceptable to
Sunni, and provisions for an amendment period were written into the
constitution that was ratified. But when the time came for amendments
to be negotiated, Kurdish and Shia leaders made it clear that no significant
redesign was contemplated.
The constitutional process in Iraq did not merely fail to bridge the
gap among the groups and their views of the future; it exacerbated the
differences greatly and helped fuel violence in Sunni areas. While the Iraqi
case is a particularly egregious instance of an ethnic carve-up, it needs to
be underscored that group differences about the future, informed by their
respective understandings of the past, are common. As Iraq shows, a poorly
conceived, rushed process can impair the ability of participants to see past
such differences and find ways to avoid hardening them.
15 International Crisis Group, Unmaking Iraq: A Constitutional Process Gone Awry, Crisis Group
Middle East Briefing No. 19 (Amman and Brussels: ICG, 26 September 2005).
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If Iraq is a cautionary tale, what course does it counsel? One radical
thought, not to be dismissed lightly, is that it is sometimes preferable to make
no new constitution than to attempt to do so in conditions of deep dissensus.
For Iraq, this possibility ought to have held considerable attraction, because the
Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) had reaffirmed the Kurds' autonomy
and provided the framework for democratic rule in the country, at least on an
interim basis. The urgency of moving to a wholly new order was mitigated
by the existence of the TAL. With an insurgency in progress in Sunni areas,
it might have been better to do nothing to inflame Sunni opinion but to
begin a quiet process of discussions among all the significant actors about the
ultimate framework that might be appropriate for Iraq.
Of course, to commend such a possibility after the fact is hardly to
assume that the relevant players, including the United States, which pressed
Iraqis to meet the deadline in the TAL (rather than amend the TAL on this
point), could have foreseen the consequences of their action. But the fact
remains that they acted recklessly, risking civil war, in proceeding as they
did, with Kurdish and Shia representatives pursuing nothing but parochial
self-interest.
In an important article,16 Allison Stanger has challenged the connection
between new constitutions and the consolidation of democracy. After 1989,
she points out, Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia did not make new
constitutions the first order of business. In Poland, a new constitution was
finally ratified in 1997. In Hungary, no new constitution was produced. And
none was produced in Czechoslovakia before the division of that country was
agreed upon in 1992. Yet, in all three cases, democracy was being practised. In
formerYugoslavia, on the other hand, successor republics adopted constitutions,
but they tended to be ethnically exclusive in their presuppositions and their
provisions - "constitutional-nationalist," in Robert Hayden's terms17 - and
their adoption made minorities disadvantaged by them think they might need
to fight rather than accede to them. In Eastern Europe and the former Soviet
Union as a whole, Stanger points out that there was no correlation between
rapid constitution-making and attainment of stable democracy.
Stanger is writing in explicit opposition to American thinking about
"constitutional moments," 8 in which, it is hypothesized, there is a chance for
16 Allison Stanger, "How Important are New Constitutions for Democratic Consolidation? Lessons
from the Post-Communist States," (2004) 11:3 Democratization I [Stanger].
17 Robert M. Hayden, Blueprints for a House Divided: The Constitutional Logic of the Yugoslav Conflicts
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999).
18 Bruce Ackerman, The Future ofLiberal Revolution (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992) at 3.
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an early legal break with the past that opens the opportunity to found a new
democratic order. If the moment passes, it may be impossible to recapture it, and
it should be seized. For one thing, public-regarding behavior is rare; for another,
those who create new constitutions will presumably act to protect what they
have created. For both reasons, early action can create durable foundations.
What we have glimpsed in Iraq and could glimpse elsewhere is that there
are times immediately after the overthrow of the authoritarians that should
not be seized; that accommodation can take time to develop, as may habits of
give-and-take among people more used to ordering and being ordered; and that
abstaining for a time may be better than doing.
V. CONSTITUTIONAL COURSES
There may be constitutional moments, but they do not necessarily arrive
on a timetable. Sometimes the period immediately following a major regime
change is not optimal for new constitution-making. Ifso, temporary abstention
needs to be contemplated, especially if there is a tolerable preexisting legal
framework available.
When the moment arrives, there is no one course that is optimal either,
particularly for severely divided societies. If majorities want majority
rule, as they usually do, it is difficult to dislodge them from this position.
Unfortunately, it often takes violence by minorities to move them. If risk-
averse minorities want guarantees, a greater-than-expected tolerance for
uncertain political outcomes will be required to induce them to abandon
insistence on an elaborate set of guarantees that, if adopted, might provoke
majority resentment and even an effort to overthrow such a regime of
guarantees. There is historical experience of this kind in, for example, Angola
in 1994 and Cyprus in 1963. In both, guarantees were overthrown, and a
resumption of violence followed.1 9 In other cases, such as Rwanda in 1992
and Sudan in 2005, majorities have abrogated guarantees, but minorities were
unable to resist forcibly.
It is worthwhile viewing proposed processes in the light of these
incompatible demands, as well as of the other constraints highlighted earlier.
One set of procedural prescriptions increasingly floated concerns the openness
of the constitution-making process. The hallmark of an adequate process,
19 Alexander B. Downes, "The Problem with Negotiated Settlements to Ethnic Civil Wars" (2004) 13
Security Studies 203 at 246; and Thomas Ehrlich, Cyprus, 1958-1967(London: Oxford University
Press, 1974) at 36-60.
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on these premises, is one that is transparent and participatory. A democratic
constitution cannot be written for a people but must be, in some active
sense, written by the people. Participatory constitution-making implies an
open process, a "'people-driven"' process that will produce a "'people-owned
constitution.' 20 On this view, public participation ought to be "initiated even
before a constitutional text [is] drafted,"21 and participation is more authentic
if it is "not simply structured on existing party lines."22
There is reason to doubt the wisdom of this prescribed process where
dissensus prevails. In severely divided societies, where claims are often zero-
sum and constitutional demands are incommensurable, a public conversation
of this kind, especially before a draft is available for criticism, is unlikely
to be fruitful. Moreover, constitutional arrangements for such a society are
likely to be complex, and most citizens have few, if any, incentives to invest
in acquiring the requisite information to deal with issues that confound
experts in the field. If there is a belief in representative government, the
constitution ought not to be exempt from it. Party politicians, who will have
to operate the institutions that emerge from the process, ought to have a role
in creating those institutions. It would not be good if they turned against
the new institutions immediately after adoption. Furthermore, in a divided
society, in which ethnic parties are regarded as guardians of group interests,
pushing party politicians to one side is likely to increase insecurity, rather
than decrease it.
Proponents of participation above all other virtues do not confront the
trade-off between wide participation and transparency, on the one hand, and
expertise, on the other. Some goals can only be achieved if experts are deployed
to think clearly, bring comparative experience to bear, and draft carefully.
These are not tasks best performed in the light of day, with large numbers
of participants. Constitutions need to be subject to public deliberation and
need to gain public approval, but that deliberation and approval, the latter by
referendum and/or legislative action, are more likely to be informed - and
less likely to be treated as a sham - if they are preceded by a design.
It is often said, too, that a democratic constitution should be a negotiated
document. Yet there is also a trade-off between negotiation and coherence.
Bargained outcomes have much to commend them - everyone gets something
20 Vivien Hart, Democratic Constitution Making, United States Institute of Peace Special Report No.
107 (Washington, D.C.: USIP, July 2003) at 7, quoting the Kenya Constitution Commission.
21 Ibid. at 9.
22 Ibid.
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- but the parts may not fit together. In Fiji, for example, a new constitution
provided an electoral system intended to produce a government of the broad
moderate middle, but a provision was then added that allowed any party with
a mere 10 percent of the seats to join the cabinet.23 Under the conditions then
prevailing, a 10-percent party was very likely to be an extremist party, and its
presence in the cabinet would cause problems for the overall design.
Some societies need a strong, coherent set of institutions to deal with
their problems. For such societies, an expert draft, possibly presented to
a constitutional commission or produced by that commission and its staff
and consultants, seems essential. Neither a wholly negotiated process nor
a wholly public, participatory process is likely to produce an appropriate
array of conflict-reducing institutions. It is often useful to place the matter
of constitutional design in the first instance in the hands of a commission
and implicitly to allow its draft a starting advantage.
In short, decision on the appropriate constitutional process ought to
follow an assessment of particular needs. If the problem is simply the
public acceptability of an agreement and there is indifference among the
particular institutions chosen - after all, many countries can live with
some standard version of parliamentary or presidential institutions24 -
then elected politicians or an elected constitutional assembly can work out
the arrangements more or less in the open, and the draft can be ratified
by the public in a referendum. The process can be open, public, and more
or less transparent. This is a course especially recommended when the
main problem of the transition is distrust, particularly distrust that the
former authoritarians will somehow find a way to steal the process and
work themselves back into power. Sunlight is an effective antiseptic for this
sort of distrust, and just this sort of distrust prevailed in several Eastern
European countries after 1989.
If, however, the problem is to craft a set of arrangements that will
facilitate reconciliation in a scarred society and enable groups in conflict
to share power in a country that desperately needs both conflict reduction
and vigorous but scrupulously democratic government, then a heavy dose
of expertise is called for. Expertise can be deployed in various ways, to be
sure - a commission is not the only way - but it will need to be deployed
in quiet, so that it can produce a consistent plan that has a fighting chance
23 See Yash P. Ghai, "The Implementation of the Fiji Islands Constitution" in A. H. Akram-Lodhi,
ed., ConfrontingFiji Futures (Canberra: Asia Pacific Press, 2000) 21.
24 A point also made by Stanger, supra note 16.
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of creating institutions that will not produce zero-sum outcomes among the
groups. Public input can be solicited and submissions sought, but the task is
inherently, at this stage, a decidedly unpublic one. Once proposals emerge,
there should then be plenty of time for public reaction, and inevitably there
will be modification of the proposals after that.
There are, in other words, several options available for constitutional
processes. They range from doing everything in the light of day, to providing
space for experts to produce a draft quietly, to merely amending the existing
constitution, to delaying major changes while consensus is being built where
dissensus currently prevails, to doing nothing. Some countries, after all, can
get along for long periods with constitutions that are less than optimal for their
needs. Indeed, the usual provisions that make constitutional amendments very
difficult are premised on the ability of states to manage with constitutional
arrangements that are stale or imperfect.
Given all that I have said about the constraints that inhere in constitution-
making and the possibility that a constitutional process can go wrong or
can produce inapt arrangements, it seems clear that uniform prescriptions
for the correct process are misguided. The best constitutional process is the
one that flows from a sober understanding of the exact problems faced by
the state contemplating a new constitution. Is the problem distrust that
can be ameliorated, is it the existence of severe intergroup divisions and a
fear of domination, is it attachment by a sector of the population to the old
institutions and a resulting divergence in views of the future, or is it more
than one of these? Once this question is answered, the appropriate process
(or the current undesirability of any process) may be glimpsed. And once this
question is answered, it may even be possible to see the general direction that
constitutional forms should take. Process should follow problems, or else
problems will surely follow the process.
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